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This paper shows how the exchange rate affects the price-setting behavior of monopolistically 
competitive firms in the sticky price framework that gives rise to a forward-looking Phillips 
Curve at the aggregate level. The open economy Phillips Curve differs from its closed economy 
counterpart in that the real exchange rate exerts a direct effect on domestic inflation. The 
exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve is pivotal in determining the optimal policy setting in 
an open economy. On balance, we find only scant empirical evidence for the existence of a direct 
exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve in a sample of six OECD countries. Indeed, the 
forward-looking Phillips Curve does not receive much backing from the data.  The use of highly 
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  11. Introduction 
  The existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve or the aggregate 
supply curve has far-reaching implications for the conduct of monetary policy in the open-
economy. Several recent contributions underscore the importance of this direct exchange rate 
effect in the design of optimal policy and in the performance of targeting strategies such as 
nominal income targeting or price-level targeting. 
In a backward-looking model for an open economy, Ball (1999) shows that the direct 
exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve matters in the setting of optimal policy. Guender 
(2005) compares and contrasts the setting of optimal policy under domestic inflation targeting 
and CPI inflation targeting in a forward-looking open-economy model. His findings suggest that 
the existence of a direct exchange rate channel prevents the policymaker from perfectly 
offsetting demand-side disturbances when the policymaker targets domestic inflation. In 
addition, the conduct of optimal policy under domestic inflation targeting depends on both 
demand-side and Phillips Curve parameters (as well as the policymaker’s preference for output 
vis-à-vis inflation variability) provided that there is a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips 
Curve.   In the absence of the direct exchange rate effect, optimal policy is only a function of the 
policymaker’s preference parameter and the parameter on the output gap in the Phillips Curve.   
  In an open economy AS-AD framework that features an imported intermediate input, 
Froyen and Guender (2000) show that the existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the AS 
relation impairs the perfect stabilizing property of nominal income targeting or price-level 
targeting in the face of demand-side disturbances. Irrespective of the underlying model, all of 
these contributions come to the conclusion that the conduct of monetary policy in an open 
economy differs substantially from the conduct of policy in a closed economy if the direct 
exchange rate channel is operative on the supply side of the economy. 
The role of a direct exchange rate effect has been investigated mainly from a theoretical 
perspective in the literature. This paper examines whether there is empirical evidence for the 
  2existence of a direct exchange rate effect in the Phillips Curve in a forward-looking open-
economy framework. While the central focus of the paper rests on the verification of a direct 
exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve, our empirical analysis also considers other issues 
such as the empirical relevance of the output gap in determining inflation and the extent to which 
past as opposed to future inflation drives current inflation. We present econometric estimates of 
the open-economy Phillips Curve for a number of OECD countries. They are: Australia, Canada, 
Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These countries share a number of 
distinctive characteristics. To begin with, they are small open economies where international 
trade plays an important role in the exchange of goods. In addition, these countries have 
maintained their independence in the conduct of monetary policy. Specifically, they have 
resisted the urge to adopt a common currency (Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New 
Zealand), and all of them engage in inflation targeting under a flexible exchange rate regime.
1  
  Empirical support for the relevance of the real exchange rate in the determination of 
domestic inflation would be an interesting finding all by itself. However, just as important would 
be the implication of this finding for the conduct of monetary policy in an open economy. 
Empirical evidence in favor of the direct exchange rate channel in the forward-looking Phillips 
Curve would buttress the notion that the conduct of monetary policy in an open economy is not 
isomorphic to the conduct of monetary policy in a closed economy. The isomorphism result is 
due to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001). They employ a forward-looking Phillips Curve that does 
not feature the real exchange rate to show that the conduct of optimal policy in an open economy 
is virtually identical to policy in a closed economy.  
Our empirical investigation produces two noteworthy findings. Firstly, the results bring 
forth only scant evidence for the existence of an exchange rate channel in the forward-looking 
Phillips Curve in the sample of OECD countries. For all countries but Korea the hypothesized 
link between the real exchange rate and the rate of inflation in the Phillips Curve is not supported 
by the data. A likely explanation for the absence of the link is that the pricing decisions of 
  3domestic producers are not affected by movements in the nominal exchange rate. Second, in all 
but one case a simple specification of the Phillips Curve featuring lagged and forward-looking 
inflation rates does not receive any support from the data. Our empirical investigation fails to 
detect a statistically significant positive relationship between the measures of the output gap 
employed in this paper and the rate of inflation. The fact that we estimate the Phillips Curve 
using highly aggregated data may account for the lack of general support in the data for the 
hypothesized link between the output gap and the rate of inflation. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II takes the standard representation of 
a closed-economy forward-looking Phillips Curve and extends it to an open economy 
framework. We show that the sticky-price framework due to Rotemberg (1982) can be 
augmented to give rise to a forward-looking open-economy Phillips Curve where the real 
exchange rate has a direct effect on domestic inflation. Section III traces the implications of the 
existence of a direct exchange rate channel for the conduct of monetary policy in an open 
economy. Section IV initially reviews the empirical literature from a closed-economy 
perspective. This is followed by the presentation of the econometric estimates of the open-
economy Phillips Curve for the chosen countries. Section V offers a summary of our findings.  
 
II. The Derivation of the Open-Economy Phillips Curve 
  Monopolistically competitive firms aim to minimize menu costs weighed against the cost 
of being away from the optimal price they would charge in the absence of those menu costs.  
This optimal price is denoted .  The objective function faced by the typical firm is: 
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where:
2 
t Ω  = the total cost at time t 
  4t p  = the price of the domestic good at time t 
*
t p  = the optimal price a firm charges. 
β    = the constant discount factor 
c   = the parameter that measures the ratio of the costs of changing prices to the costs of 
deviating from the optimal price 
t E   = the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t.     
After taking and rearranging the first-order condition for the above cost-minimization problem 
(where we have assumedβ to equal one for simplicity), we can characterize the relationship 
between past, current, and future price levels as: 
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where all variables are as previously defined. In addition: 
 
t p ˆ  = the price charged by foreign firms at time t 
yt  = the output gap at time t (the difference between the level of real output and potential output) 
t ς  = a stochastic disturbance.  
  The optimal price is set as a mark-up over marginal cost. But marginal cost and the 
output gap are positively related.
3 Hence it is innocuous to replace marginal cost with the output 
gap in (3).   So far our analysis of price-setting behavior has been very much in the spirit of the 
closed economy “New Keynesian Framework”. In a small open economy, however, the price-
  5setting behavior of domestic firms also takes into consideration developments abroad. Being a 
small player in world markets, the typical firm is guided in its pricing decision by the prevailing 
conditions in world markets.
4 More specifically, there exists a benchmark price   that the firm 
faces in world markets. This benchmark price affects the optimal price charged by the firm. 
Indeed, the firm adjusts its optimal price in line with the domestic currency price of the final 
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where 
f
t p  = the price of the foreign good in foreign currency at time t 
st = the nominal exchange rate at time t (units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). 
  From equation (4) it is evident that there is a one-for-one “pass-through” effect of the 
nominal exchange rate on the optimal price. 
Using this specification for , we can rewrite equation (3) as:  
*
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  () () t t t
f





p p E p p
κ
ς + − − − − = − − − + −  (5) 
The real exchange rate, defined as  , appears on the right-hand side of equation 
(5).  After aggregating over all firms, equation (5) represents a Phillips Curve relation for an 
open economy. The same equation can also be expressed as: 
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  Equation (6) differs from the standard forward-looking Phillips Curve by allowing the 
real exchange rate to affect domestic inflation directly.
 In the wake of a depreciation of the 
domestic currency, domestically produced goods become cheaper in world markets. Hence 
domestic production is stepped up. In addition, the domestic currency price of the imported 
foreign consumption good rises. Both the rise in domestic production and in the price of the 
import-competing good cause the optimal price to increase. Facing an increase in the optimal 
price, firms raise the price of their output so as to minimize the deviation between the actual 
price charged and the optimal price. At the aggregate level, the increase in the domestic price 
level causes the rate of domestic inflation to rise. Thus we observe the positive link between the 
real exchange rate and the rate of domestic inflation.
5   
 
III. The Relevance of the Direct Exchange Rate Channel in the Conduct of Optimal Monetary 
Policy in an Open Economy 
  In this section we present a simple forward-looking model of a small open economy. The 
model consists of three equations. All variables with the exception of the nominal interest rate 
are expressed in logarithms.  All parameters are positive. 
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where all variables are defined as previously. In addition: 
 
1 + t t E π  = the expectation of   1 + t π  formed at time t. 
f
t t E 1 + π = the expectation formed at time t of the foreign rate of inflation for period t+1 
t R  = the domestic nominal interest rate at time t. 
f
t R = the foreign nominal interest rate at time t. 
1 + t tq E = the expectation dated t of the real exchange rate for period t+1. 
t v , and t ε  are stochastic disturbances.  
The first two relations incorporate the forward-looking behavior typical of the New 
Keynesian framework. Equation (6) represents the forward-looking Phillips curve relation for the 
open economy derived in the previous section. Equation (7) defines an open economy IS relation 
– the output gap depends on the expected real interest rate and the real exchange rate.
6  Equation 
(8) is the uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP), expressed in real terms. This equation 
embodies the assumption of perfect capital mobility, reflecting the high level of integration of a 
small open economy’s financial sector with the rest of the world.  The disturbance term t ε  can be 
interpreted as a time-varying risk premium.
   
The Preferences of the Policymaker 
  The policymaker’s preferences extend over the variance of the output gap  and the 
domestic rate of inflation 
t V(y )
t V( ) π , respectively. The expected loss function that he attempts to 
minimize is given by:  
 
 () () () tt EL Vy V t μ π =+                                                          (9) 
  8Solving the Model 
  The policymaker sets policy on the basis of the two variables that he cares about: the 
output gap yt and the rate of domestic inflation πt:
  
 
 0 ) ( = + t t y π θ                          (10) 
 The  policy  parameter  θ  indicates the weight the policymaker attaches to the output gap 
relative to the rate of inflation in setting policy. To solve the model, we first solve the UIP 
condition for qt and substitute the resulting expression into the Phillips Curve and the IS relation. 
These two expressions are in turn substituted in turn into the policy rule, equation (10). Solving 
this equation for Rt yields the policymaker’s reaction function: 
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  To obtain a reduced form solution for yt, we substitute the reaction function into the IS 
function (after replacing the real exchange rate with the remaining variables of the UIP 
(12) 
 
condition). This equation takes the following form: 
Optimal Monetary Policy under Simple Commitment 
7
Under the assumption of white noise disturbances, the conditional expectations of the 
3 )  
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endogenous variables are straightforward:
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tt Eπ + T of he expectation   the foreign rate of inflation, , is likewise zero.   Substituting these 
xpectations into  uation (12) yields the following final form equation for real output:  e eq
 
[ ] t t
f
t t t u a a R b a bv
b a a a
y ) ( ) (
) )( (
1




    
2 1
(14) 
The solution for the domestic rate of inflation is given by  
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alculation of the variances of inflation and the real output gap is straightforward. After 
quation (9), we can express the objective of the policymaker in the 
    (16) 
 
inimize 
fluctuations in the output gap and the domestic rate of inflation. The resulting optimal value for 
C
inserting both variances into e
following way: 
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The policymaker chooses θ, the weight on the output gap in the policy rule, so as to m
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Equation (17) shows that in the forward-looki
gap in the policy rule is a function of the parameters of both the IS relation and the Phillips 
ng open economy model the weight on the output 
  10curve.
9  This is a consequence of the fact that a change in the policy setting has an immediate 
impact on the nominal exchange rate that in turn has a direct effect on the rate of inflation 
through the real exchange rate in the Phillips curve. This effect complements the indirect effect 
on the rate of inflation brought about by a change in the output gap through changes in the 
expected real rate of interest and the real exchange rate.   
Notice the pivotal role played by the direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve. 
In its absence b=0. Hence for an open economy where the direct exchange rate channel is not 
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This is the same setting for the optimal policy parameter in a closed economy. Demand-side 
parame rs such as the sensitivity of the output gap to the expected real rate of interest  and 
urves 
A few papers take the theoretical specification of the forward-looking Phillips Curve to 
 
te 1 () a
the real exchange rate() a do not figure in the optimal setting of θ in the open economy 
framework because in the absence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve the 
policymaker can perfectly offset demand-side shocks by simply varying the interest rate. 
 
IV. Empirical Specifications of Closed and Open-Economy Forward-Looking Phillips C
2
 
the data. Fuhrer (1997), Gali and Gertler (1999), Roberts (1997, 2005), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), Rudebusch (2001), and Sbordone (1998), to name but a few, dwell on 
theoretical and empirical aspects of modeling the Phillips Curve. These existing contributions 
share three characteristics. First, they estimate a closed-economy version of the Phillips Curve. 
Second, the importance of expected future inflation relative to past inflation in predicting current 
inflation is assessed.  Third, the empirical investigations are based on US data. Still, there is at 
  11least one important unresolved issue. The point of contention concerns the choice of a suitable 
proxy variable for marginal cost in the estimation stage. 
Most economists now acknowledge that the strict version of the forward-looking model – 
which includes expected future inflation but excludes lags of the rate of inflation - does not fit 
the dat
al specification of the forward-looking model includes 
margin
a very well. As a consequence, attention has focused largely on motivating the addition of 
lagged inflation to the Phillips curve specification. Roberts (2005) describes three ways in which 
lagged inflation enters the Phillips Curve specification. One way to introduce lagged inflation is 
to do away with the assumption of complete rationality. In this scenario, a fraction of agents do 
not exhibit optimizing behavior in setting prices but instead follow a rule of thumb such as 
basing their forecast of inflation on lagged inflation. The two remaining ways of introducing 
lagged inflation into the forward-looking Phillips Curve retain the assumption of complete 
rationality but draw on structural features of the economy or change the specification of the error 
process. If wage bargains are conditioned on the change in the real wage (Fuhrer and Moore 
(1995)), then both forward-looking expectations of inflation and lagged inflation enter the 
Phillips Curve. The occurrence of serial correlation in the error results from potential 
shortcomings in calculating the trend component of output. This possibility was first pointed out 
by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).    
There is an ongoing debate on the most suitable proxy variable for marginal cost. As 
pointed out in Section II, the theoretic
al cost as a right-hand side variable of the Phillips Curve equation. The last step of the 
derivation of the forward-looking Phillips Curve links marginal cost to aggregate economic 
activity with a view towards establishing the connection between the rate of inflation and 
aggregate economic activity as in earlier renditions of the Phillips Curve. Sbordone (1998) and 
Gali and Gertler (1999) do not take this last step. Instead they argue that the cost of labor is a 
good proxy for marginal cost. In their empirical test of the goodness of fit of the forward-looking 
model, they use the labor share of income as a proxy to show that it exerts a statistically 
  12significant positive effect on inflation as predicted by the model.  These results are questioned by 
Roberts (2005) who attributes the positive link between the cost of labor and inflation to the pro-
cyclical behavior of average productivity that underlies the calculations of Sbordone and Gali 
and Gertler. As a result, Roberts sticks with more conventional ways of estimating the level of 
economic activity relative to potential such as capacity output, the output gap (based on Hodrick-
Prescott filter) or the rate of unemployment.  
Our investigation of the empirical relevance of the open-economy forward-looking 




tions on the model is standard practice.
12  As prices typically remain fixed for a 
year or longer, single leads or lags of the rate of inflation do not capture the true nature of the 
imation technique. Our preferred measure of the rate of inflation is based on the GDP 
deflator. This is in line with the spirit of the model which suggests that domestic inflation should 
enter the specification of the Phillips Curve. However, we also report our findings for the case 
where the CPI-based rate of inflation is employed to estimate the Phillips Curve. Although the 
CPI is narrower in scope than the GDP deflator, it has the advantage of measuring market prices. 
In marked contrast, the GDP deflator is based in no small measure on imputed prices. We also 
employ two widely-used measures of the output gap. The first measure is derived from a simple 
detrending procedure. We regress the level of real output on a quadratic trend and use the 
resulting residuals as our measure of the output gap. The second measure is based on the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter.
10 For New Zealand, we actually try a third measure of the output gap. 
The multivariate filter is an augmented version of the Hodrick-Prescott filter and employed by 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in its assessment of current and future economic conditions.
11
The bilateral nominal exchange rate of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the US Dollar, the 
US GDP deflator, and the domestic GDP deflator are employed in the calculation of the real
ge rate. 
The rate of expected inflation next period is replaced with its actual value. Imposing 
rational expecta
  13inflatio
 than full-information 
maxim
ces asymptotically valid Wald, 
Lagran
 data confirm its existence, then the setting of the optimal policy parameter 
n dynamics in quarterly data. Because of this, three- or four-period averages of the leads 
and lags of inflation are employed in the estimation of the Phillips Curve.  
Due to the endogeneity of future inflation, the output gap, and the real exchange rate, we 
use the instrumental variables approach in the estimation stage.
13 This limited information 
estimation procedure proves to be more robust to potential misspecification
um likelihood.
14  Lags of the rate of inflation, the output gap, the real exchange rate, and if 
applicable, lags of the dummy variables serve as instruments.  
As a check on the presence of serial correlation in the residuals, we run Godfrey’s (1994) 
test for serial correlation in dynamic models estimated by instrumental variables. This procedure 
adds lagged residuals to the set of instruments and produ
ge Multiplier or Likelihood Ratio tests for serial correlation. We test for both first-order 
and fourth-order serial correlation using the Lagrange Multiplier test.  
Taken altogether, our investigation of the empirical validity of the forward-looking Phillips 
Curve in small open economies attempts to shed light on three separate modeling issues. They 
concern: 
 
1.  the extent to which a direct exchange rate channel is operative in the Phillips Curve. If 
the θ  in an 




The specification of the forward-looking Phillips Curve that we estimate takes the following 
form
merely on the sensitivity of the rate of inflation to the output gap in the Phillips Curve.  
the importance of future inflation relative to past inflation in determining  urrent 
inflation. 
the contemporaneous effect of the output gap on the rate of inflation. 
:
15
  14 
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All variables are as previously defined. 
The sample period extends from the early  980s to 2002 for the two European countries 
nd Canada. For Korea and the Antipodean countries the sample period is somewhat shorter.
16 
erly data. The data were retrieved from the OECD Main 
Econom
d to derive the output gap, we find that past 
inflatio
Prescott filter. All in all, the findings based on the Hodrick-Prescott filter are equally supportive 
1
a
The empirical analysis is based on quart
ic Indicators database.  
Our empirical findings are summarized in Tables 1 through 5.  Tables 1 and 2 present the 
findings for the case where inflation is defined in terms of changes in the log of the GDP 
deflator. When a deterministic trend is employe
n is more important than future inflation in predicting current inflation. According to 
Table  1, for the UK, Korea, and Canada the effect on current inflation of the three-quarter 
average of past inflation is positive and significant at the one or five percent level. For Canada, 
there is also a statistically significant positive link between future inflation and current inflation. 
The same positive link exists in Australia but it is only marginally significant at the ten percent 
level. There is only scant evidence for the hypothesized positive effect of the real exchange rate 
and the output gap on current inflation. For Korea positive changes in the real exchange rate (i.e. 
devaluation or depreciation) appear to have exerted upward pressure on domestic inflation. For 
Canada there is a weak relation between domestic inflation and (the second difference of) the 
real exchange rate but it bears the wrong sign. The only country where domestic inflation reacts 
to the output gap is the United Kingdom. The positive effect of the output gap on domestic 
inflation is significant at the one percent level. 
Table 2 presents the findings when the output gap is calculated by means of the Hodrick-
  15of the existence of a backward linkage of inflation in the United Kingdom, Korea, and Canada, 
confirm positive link between future and current inflation in Canada but offer only weak 
evidenc
otice that in Canada future inflation is not 
only st
 significant and the marginal effect of the direct exchange rate channel on CPI 
inflatio
e filter is the standard Hodrick-Prescott Filter supplemented by three additional 
gaps: an inflation gap derived from an expectations-augmented Phillips Curve, an unemployment 
e that points to the existence of a potent direct exchange rate channel in Korea. There is 
no discernible effect of the output gap on inflation.  
Tables 3 and 4 contain the results for the case where the rate of inflation is calculated as 
the log difference of the Consumer Price Index. The coefficient on lagged inflation is statistically 
significant in three of the six countries, and the size of the coefficient ranges from a high of 
0.4494 in Australia to a low of 0.2737 in Canada. N
atistically significant but it has also a greater positive effect on current inflation than past 
inflation. The CPI inflation results for Canada mimic the inflation linkages reported in Table 1. 
The potency of the direct exchange rate channel in Korea is again apparent in the results reported 
in Table 3 although its economic significance is somewhat weaker compared to Table 1. For the 
UK the coefficient on the real exchange rate bears the wrong sign.
17 The output gap based on the 
deterministic trend does not exert a significant effect on CPI inflation in any one of the six 
countries. 
When the Hodrick-Prescott filter generates the output gap, the results do not change 
dramatically. But there are a few notable changes. As shown in Table 4, past inflation is no 
longer a significant factor for current inflation in Canada while for the UK past inflation is now 
marginally
n disappears. In New Zealand the output gap now exerts a marginally significant effect on 
CPI inflation.  
  Owing to the prominent role of the output gap in policy deliberations, central banks use 
sophisticated techniques to construct alternative, more accurate measures of the output gap. For 
instance, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand uses a multivariate filter to generate the output gap.  
The multivariat
  16gap, and a capacity utilization gap. Because it incorporates more information about the state of 
the economy, the multivariate filter should be a better indicator of the existing or impending 
inflationary pressure than other more conventional measures.
18 Table 5 shows that the output gap 
generated with the help of the multivariate filter bears no statistically significant positive 
relationship to either rate of inflation in New Zealand. Thus, even a more sophisticated technique 
for determining the output gap fails to establish the positive co-movement between the output 
gap and the rate of inflation in New Zealand data. 
 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
  This paper highlights the important role that the exchange rate plays on the supply side of 
an open economy. Specifically, the paper shows how the exchange rate affects the price-setting 
behavior of monopolistically competitive firms in a microeconomic framework that gives rise to 
 forward-looking Phillips Curve at the aggregate level. The open economy Phillips Curve 
 counterpart in that the real exchange rate exerts a direct effect on 
omest
, we assess the extent to which past inflation as opposed to future inflation explains 
current
a
differs from its closed economy
d ic inflation. The existence of this direct exchange rate channel implies that both IS and 
Phillips Curve parameters are instrumental in determining the conduct of optimal monetary 
policy. 
Drawing on data from six small open economies, the empirical part of the paper seeks to 
verify the existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve. A general 
specification of the forward-looking Phillips Curve model is set up with a view towards 
examining the hypothesized link between the real exchange rate and the rate of inflation. In 
addition
 inflation. The effect of the output gap on inflation is also examined.  On balance, we find 
only scant evidence for the existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve. 
Substantial evidence in favor of this channel exists only for Korea. Thus the important role of a 
direct exchange rate channel in the determination of optimal monetary policy is confirmed only 
  17for Korea. But even this conclusion is tempered somewhat by the existence of fourth-order serial 
correlation in the residuals when CPI inflation is used. The absence of a strong link between the 
real exchange rate and the rate of inflation may be due to the fact that the “pass-through” effect 
of  the nominal exchange rate on the optimal domestic price is non-existent.  
The empirical results attest to the importance of past inflation in explaining the current 
rate of inflation. In all countries but Sweden there exists a strong link between past and current 
domestic or CPI inflation. The link between future inflation and current inflation is more 
tenuous, especially for domestic, i.e. GDP deflator-based inflation. Future domestic inflation is 




 and certain 
manufacturing sectors (apparel, machinery, general manufacturing) of the economy than in 
Econometric inference is hampered by the existence of serial correlation in a few cases. 
For instance, the LM test for fourth-order serial correlation uncovers a systematic pattern in the 
regression residuals for Canada. This may be indicative of a misspecification problem. At the 
very least, the existence of fourth-order serial correlation in the residuals suggests that the results 
reported for Canada and the results based on the CPI for Korea are to be interpreted wit
In our cross-country analysis neither measure of the output gap measure exerts a 
significant positive effect on the rate of inflation. This result is somewhat surprising in view of 
the central role played by the output gap in policy discussions. At the same time it underscores 
the urgent need to construct accurate statistical measures of the output gap. Simple detrending 
procedures or filters such as the ones employed in this paper may not do the trick. A promisin
tive would be to devise improved measures of the proxy for marginal cost.
19  
The use of highly aggregated data may also account for the poor performance of the 
Phillips Curve specification employed in this paper. Future research ought to focus on the extent 
of price stickiness at the industry level. It is conceivable that the specification of the New 
Keynesian Phillips Curve receives stronger empirical support at a more disaggregate level, i.e. at 
the industry level. After all, price stickiness is more ingrained in service-oriented
  18others. The forward-looking Phillips Curve may also fare better in an empirical analysis that 
distinguishes between the rate of inflation for tradable and non-tradable goods.
20 
 
Taken altogether, we are led to the conclusion that the model of the forward-looking 
Phillips Curve derived in this paper does not receive much backing from aggregate data.   
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  22Table 1: GDP-Inflation: Output Gap Based on Deterministic Time Trend  




NZ 0.1815  0.0919  0.1543  -0.0073  -0.0044    1.75/1.98  0.0116
88:3-02:4  (0.3634) (0.9054) (0.2398) (0.0860) (0.0203)      
  
Australia 0.5053 0.7187
# -0.0702 -0.0478 0.0048    5.45
*/4.98
** 0.0051




* 0.0364 -0.0060    0.023/1.55 0.0126
91:2-02:4  (0.1143) (0.4488) (0.0547) (0.0778) (0.0045)      
 
Sweden 0.3442 0.3800 -0.0718 0.0049 0.0353    2.82/2.07 0.0122
82:1-02:4  (0.4994) (0.6447) (0.0476) (0.0406) (0.0424)      
 
UK 0.9606
** -0.7864 0.0078 0.1589
** -0.0105 0.0367
** 1.56/1.51 0.0063





# 0.0028    1.07/9.08
** 0.0051
82:2-02:4  (0.1247) (0.4273) (0.0392) (0.0249)        
Notes: 
1.  Standard errors are in parentheses (calculation based on Newey-West HAC in EVIEWS).  # significant at 
the 10 percent level  * significant at the 5 percent level  ** significant at the 1 percent level 
2.  Lagged and future inflation are defined as follows: 
  123 () / 3 ttt Bpi π ππ −−− =+ + 123 () / 3 ttt Fpi   = π ππ +++ ++  
The definition of lagged and future inflation for the UK is based on 4 lags and 4 leads, respectively. 
3.  Four lags of the rate of inflation ( tj π − , j=1…4), the real exchange rate, the output gap and the dummy 
variable(s) appear in the set of instruments. 
4.  X is a dummy variable. For New Zealand, Australia, and Korea it is meant to capture the effect of the 
Asian Currency Crisis. X = 1 for 1997:2 – 1998:4, X =0 otherwise. For Sweden and the United Kingdom 
the dummy variable is meant to capture the European Exchange Rate Crisis of September 1992. X=1 for 
1992:3, X= 0 otherwise. 
5.  X2 captures the effect of the miner”s strike in the UK in 1984.  
6.  Godfrey”s LM test for serial correlation, reported in column 8, consists of computing 
2
00 ( ; )/ ( ; )/ g
2
0 IVLM ESS e W s ESS e W s =−. After multiplying IVLM  by 1/ , we compare the test 
statistic to a right-hand tail critical value of the 
g
(, ) FgN k g − −  distribution. In the paper, we test for 
first and fourth-order serial correlation. Hence g=1,4.  N= number of observations, k = number of 
regressors, and  = the sum of squared residuals divided by N-k. ESS = Explained sum of squares. W=set 
of instruments.  e
2
0 s
0=IV  residuals from restricted equation. eg=IV  residuals from unrestricted equation. 
  23Table 2: GDP-Inflation: Output Gap Based on Hodrick Prescott Filter 
(HPy) 
 




NZ 0.1781  -0.0307  0.1767  -0.0140  -0.0056    1.57/0.99  0.0117
88:3-02:4  (0.3719) (1.0093) (0.2657) (0.1305) (0.0202)      
  
Australia 0.7464  0.7548 -0.1288 -0.1785 0.0115    3.54/4.37
** 0.0060




# -0.0142 -0.0127    0.01/2.23  0.0129
91:2-02:4  (0.1345) (0.3988) (0.0668) (0.1201) (0.0081)      
  
Sweden 0.5102 0.0764 -0.0876 -0.0509 0.0140    1.78/9.26
** 0.0121
82:1-02:4  (0.8493) (1.4938) (0.0738) (0.0932) (0.0583)      
  
UK 0.7931
** -0.2572 -0.0079 0.1500 -0.0175 0.0288
# 0.02/0.91 0.0068




* -0.0605 0.0389 -0.0143    0.90/8.96
** 0.0056




7.  BPi and FPi for Sweden and UK include 4 lags and 4 leads. BPi and FPi for NZ, Australia, Korea and 
Canada include 3 lags and 3 leads. 
 
  24Table 3: CPI-Inflation: Output Gap Based on Deterministic Time Trend  
 




** 0.2319 -0.0421 0.0517  0.18/1.33  0.0061 
88:3-02:4  (0.1672) (0.5061)  (0.0483)  (0.0319)     
 
Australia 0.4494
** -0.1056 -0.0184 0.1008  0.42/0.38  0.0067 
90:4-02:4  (0.1611) (0.6356)  (0.0343)  (0.1359)     
 
Korea 0.4036  0.7875  0.0478
* -0.0218 0.008/4.48
** 0.0065 
91:2-02:4  (0.3126) (0.8205)  (0.0238)  (0.0630)     
 
Sweden 0.8212  -0.0899 0.0275  0.0630  1.18/1.10  0.0105 
82:1-02:4  (0.5335) (0.6779)  (0.0293)  (0.0553)     
 
UK 0.3791  0.6964  -0.1141
# -0.0423 0.17/2.46  0.0093 




** 0.0084 -0.0046  3.34/3.84
** 0.0039 




8.  BCPI and FCPI for all countries are based on  4 lags and 4 leads 
      1234 () / 4
CPI CPI CPI CPI
tttt BCPI ππππ −−−− = +++ 1234 () / 4
CPI CPI CPI CPI
tttt FCPI ππππ ++++ = +++
9.  The dummy variables have been dropped from the specification in a number of countries as they do not 
exercise any meaningful effect on CPI inflation but cause problems applying the instrumental variables 
procedure. The coefficients of the dummy variables are not significant in any one of the countries. 
 
 
  25Table 4: CPI-Inflation: Output Gap Based on Hodrick-Prescott Filter (HPy) 
 




** 0.1386 -0.0111 0.1209
# 0.03/0.84 0.0057 
88:3-02:4  (0.1251) (0.3333) (0.0411) (0.0701)     
 
Australia 0.4390
** -0.0145 -0.0144  0.2734  0.06/0.20  0.0064 
90:4-02:4  (0.1371) (0.7445) (0.0235) (0.3316)     
 




91:2-02:4  (0.2195) (0.4998) (0.0205) (0.0667)     
 
Sweden 0.6304 0.2109 0.0190 0.0637  2.87/1.57  0.0096 
82:1-02:4  (0.5693) (0.7279) (0.0263) (0.0938)     
 
UK 0.6667
# -0.1818 -0.0958  0.1433  0.003/1.52  0.0091 
82:2-02:4  (0.3879) (0.9005) (0.0602) (0.1862)     
 
Canada 0.1271  0.9531
** 0.0247 -0.0343 1.67/4.20
** 0.0044 




10.  BCPI and FCPI for all countries are based on  4 lags and 4 leads 
11.  The dummy variables have been dropped from the specification in a number of countries as they do not 
exercise any meaningful effect on CPI inflation but cause problems in interpreting the results produced by 
the instrumental variables procedure. In any event, the coefficient(s) on the dummy variable(s) is (are) not 
statistically significant in any one of the six countries.   
 
  26Table 5:  Output Gap for New Zealand Based on Multivariate Filter:  
 
A.  Inflation Based on CPI: 
Sample Period 
88:3-02:4 




** 0.0592 -0.0124 0.0009 0.53/1.10  0.0056 
 (0.1871)  (0.4117) (0.0677)  (0.0006)    
         B. Inflation Based on GDP Deflator:  
Sample Period 
       88:3-02:4 
BPI FPI  q Δ   RBNZy IVLM 
AR(1)/AR(4) 
Std Error
  0.2588 0.5356  0.0433 -0.0008 0.02/2.96*  0.0114 
 (0.2942)  (0.6959) (0.2069)  (0.0016)    
 
 Notes: 
13.  RBNZy= output gap based on multivariate filter. A unit root test for this series over the 1983Q1-2006Q2 period 
rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root in the output gap at the 1 percent level. 
14.  The regression equation where inflation is measured as the log change in the GDP Deflator also contains a 























  27ENDNOTES 
                                                 
12 1
1. The Bank of Korea began to target the rate of inflation in 1998 in the wake of the Asian Currency Crisis. The other 
countries adopted inflation targeting in the late 1980s or the early 1990s.  
2 Lower case letters denote the logarithms of variables. 
3 Within a general equilibrium framework, the comovement between marginal cost and economic activity can be 
established by combining the labor supply and demand relations with the market clearing condition in the goods 
market. On this point see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001, 2002) or Gali and Monacelli (2005) who derive a similar 
relation that stresses the positive relation between real marginal cost and domestic consumption. The positive link 
between real output and marginal cost is also characteristic of earlier models of monopolistic competition such as 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).  
4 For the pricing decision of domestic firms to be sensitive to the prevailing price charged by foreign competitors, it 
is necessary to drop the assumption of constant elasticity of substitution in the utility function of households.  Bergin 
and Feenstra (2000) and Taylor (2000) show how a translog specification for preferences or a linear demand 
relation yields an optimal pricing rule that responds to competitors’ prices in addition to marginal cost. Equation (3) 
embodies this idea.  
5 An open-economy Phillips Curve can also be derived from the Calvo (1983) model that emphasizes stochastic 
price adjustment. This approach emphasizes that nominal marginal cost and the domestic currency price of the 
foreign consumption good are the factors that govern the determination of the price of the domestic consumption 
good. As firms are uncertain about the next available opportunity to change their prices, they look at the future 
evolution of both factors. The resulting Phillips Curve also features a real exchange rate channel in the Phillips 
Curve. See Guender (2006) for how the closed-economy Calvo model can be extended to an open economy.  
6 This is a simplified version of McCallum and Nelson’s (1999) IS relation for an open economy. Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler (2001,2002), Gali and Monacelli (2005), and Monacelli (2005) model aggregate demand in similar fashion. 
For an explicit derivation of an IS relation in an open economy framework, see Guender (2006). For the purpose at 
hand, the simplified version of the IS relation is entirely satisfactory as the degree of openness of the model 
economy, which affects the size of the parameters of the IS relation, is assumed constant. Moreover, the effect of a 
foreign output shock is similar to the effect of an IS shock. Hence the foreign output shock does not appear in the 
simplified version of the IS relation. 
7 The timeless perspective of monetary policy is stronger form of commitment that introduces inertia into the 
behaviour of real output and inflation. Froyen and Guender (2007), McCallum and Nelson (2004), Woodford (2003) 
discuss the timeless perspective in greater detail.  
8 As the stochastic disturbances follow a white noise process, there is no difference between optimal policy under 
discretion and simple commitment. For the case of autocorrelated disturbances, the setting of optimal policy under 
simple commitment depends also on the degree of persistence in the disturbances.  See Froyen and Guender (2007) 
for a detailed analysis of this case. 
9 The expression in equation (17) is also the solution to the case of monetary policy being carried out under 
discretion. Under discretion, the policymaker minimizes the loss function, treating all expectations as fixed. As seen 
above, under commitment, all expectations of the endogenous variables are fixed at zero due to the assumption of all 
shocks following white noise processes. Hence the optimal weight on real output is the same for both discretion and 
commitment. 
10 The smoothing parameter is set to 1600. 
11 In our empirical analysis, we sidestep an issue concerning the measurement of the output gap that has received 
wide attention in policy circles. The issue focuses on the availability of only imprecise measures of the output gap 
when monetary policy decisions are taken. See Orphanides (2001) for a detailed account of the use of ‘real time” 
data in the implementation of monetary policy in the United States. 
12 See Roberts (1995, 2005), Gali and Gertler (1999). The alternative would be to use surveys of inflationary 
expectations as is done by Roberts (1995, 1998) or Rudebusch (2002).   
13 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are carried out to test for the non-stationarity of the variables. These tests prove 
helpful in avoiding specifying an unbalanced regression model. The tests reveal that the rate of inflation and the 
output gap in each country are not non-stationary. However, the real exchange rate in all countries but Canada 
contains a unit root. In the case of Canada the null hypothesis of a unit root in the change of the real exchange rate 
cannot be rejected. As a consequence, the second difference of the real exchange rate appears in the model of the 
Phillips Curve estimated for Canada while the first difference of the real exchange rate appears in the specification 
of the Phillips Curve for the other countries.  
14 Roberts (2005) emphasizes this point. 
15 The condition γ γ += is not imposed on the specification. This is sometimes done to gauge the empirical 
relevance of the backward relative to the forward-looking element.  
16 The different sample periods for the countries are due to the limited availability of quarterly data for Australia, 
Korea, and New Zealand in the OECD database. Extending the empirical analysis to the early or mid-1980s would 
  28                                                                                                                                                             
CPI
ttt q ππ α =+ Δ
complicate matters for the case of New Zealand due to shifts in regimes (switch to a pure float in 1985) and the 
deregulation of the financial sector.  
17 The negative effect may capture exchange rate pass-through. Suppose nominal exchange rate changes are passed 
through completely. Then  where  α represents the share of foreign goods in the CPI. An 
appreciation of the real exchange rate ( ) thus exerts downward pressure on CPI inflation.  0 t q Δ<
18  See Graff (2004) for further details. 
19 As pointed out earlier, existing proxies for marginal cost such as the labour income share (used by Gali and 
Gertler (1999)) have also been found wanting. For more on the choice of a suitable proxy for marginal cost, the 
reader is referred to Roberts (2005) and Gwin and VanHoose (2005). The latter investigate the extent of price 
stickiness at the industry level in the United States and employ the percentage change in average variable cost as the 
proxy for marginal cost.   
20 Matheson (2006) presents empirical evidence for New Zealand and Australia according to which sectoral Phillips 
Curves fit the data much better than an aggregate Phillips Curve. 
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